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Securities Regulation
by David K. Brown*
and Derek B. Swanson
This Article examines significant cases originating in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during 2012 and 2013
under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act or 1933 Act),' the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act or 1934 Act),2 and
the rules promulgated thereunder. In particular, Part I of this Article
addresses a recent decision involving alleged material misstatements in
connection with an initial public offering. Part II analyzes a recent case
addressing the loss-causation element of a claim of fraud under United
States securities law, namely, under § 10(b)r of the Exchange Act and
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 (Rule 10b-5).4 Finally, Part III surveys two
recent cases involving the materiality element in the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement cases involving alleged
violations of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
As reflected in the cases discussed below, when it comes to a private
right of action under the Securities Act and the antifraud provisions of
the Exchange Act, plaintiffs face some difficult hurdles in successfully
pleading a cause of action that can withstand a motion to dismiss. With
respect to private rights of action under the Securities Act, as discussed
in Part I of this Article, plaintiffs face an uphill battle in successfully

* Partner in the firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1995); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2000);
Georgia State University J. Mack Robinson College of Business (M.B.A., 2000). Member
and Associate Editor, Georgia State University Law Review (1999-2000). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Associate in the firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Purdue
University (B.A., 2001); Indiana University School of Law - Indianapolis (J.D., cum laude,
2004). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Member, Bar of the District of Columbia.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012).
2. 15 U.S.C. H§78a-78pp (2012).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
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arguing that disclosures in a registration statement and prospectus were
materially misleading (or contained a material omission), especially
where the disclosure document is well-drafted and structured to
anticipate potential risks in investing in the company's securities. With
respect to private rights of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under
the Exchange Act, as discussed in Part II of this Article, plaintiffs face
the difficult task of successfully pleading the loss-causation element,
especially where the fraud-on-the-market theory is asserted. Finally, as
discussed in Part III of this Article, the court of appeals has provided the
SEC with limited latitude in showing materiality of a misstatement, and
while favorable to the SEC in this particular case, the court's extension
of the reliance test to enforcement actions could raise the bar for the
SEC.
I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES CLAIMS OF MATERIAL
MISSTATEMENTS IN A REGISTRATION STATEMENT AND PROSPECTUS
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT

In a recent case involving an initial public offering that was conducted
after the "Great Recession" of 2008, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
alleged misstatements or omissions in the registration statement and
related prospectus were not material." In so holding, the Eleventh
Circuit illustrated the importance of well-drafted offering documents
that include ample risk-factor coverage and other meaningful cautionary
language. The case also demonstrates the important distinction between
facts that are material because they significantly alter the total mix of
information required to be disclosed to investors and facts that are not
material even though they are viewed within the company as important.
A.

Antifraud Claims under § 11 and § 12(a)(2) of the SecuritiesAct
In Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc.,' the investor-plaintiffs claimed that
the defendant-appellees, including the issuer of the securities (Vitacost),
made material misstatements and omissions in the offering documents
for Vitacost's initial public offering (IPO).' In marshalling these
arguments, the investors claimed that Vitacost and the other defendants
had violated § 118 of the Securities Act and § 12(a)(2)' of the Securities

5. Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2013).
6. 715 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2013).
7. Id. at 1260.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). The relevant excerpt of § 11 of the Securities Act reads
as follows:
(a) Persons possessing cause of action; persons liable
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Act; the relevant sections of which are quoted in the endnotes following
this Article.'o
Section 11 of the Securities Act creates a private right of action where
a registration statement filed under the 1933 Act (including the
prospectus contained therein), "contain[s] an untrue statement of a
material fact or omit[s] to state a material fact required to be stated [in
the registration statement] or necessary to make the statements therein

In case any part of the registration statement, when such part became effective,
contained an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not
misleading, any person acquiring such security (unless it is proved that at the
time of such acquisition he knew of such untruth or omission) may, either at law
or in equity, in any court of competent jurisdiction, sue(1) every person who signed the registration statement;
(2) every person who was a director of (or person performing similar functions)
or partner in the issuer at the time of the filing of the part of the registration
statement with respect to which his liability is asserted;
(3) every person who, with his consent, is named in the registration statement
as being or about to become a director, person performing similar functions, or
partner;
(4) every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession
gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been
named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or
as having prepared or certified any report or valuation which is used in connection
with the registration statement, with respect to the statement in such registration
statement, report, or valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified
by him;
(5) every underwriter with respect to such security.

15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
9. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act reads as follows:
(a) In general
Any person who-.. . offers or sells a security (whether or not exempted by the
provisions of [N3], other than paragraphs (2) and (14) of subsection (a) of said
section), by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral
communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading (the purchaser not
knowing of such untruth or omission), and who shall not sustain the burden of
proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known, of such untruth or omission, shall be liable, subject to subsection (b) of this
section, to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue either at
law or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration
paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer
owns the security.
15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012).
10. Miyahira, 715 F.3d at 1264.
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not misleading."n Section 12(a)(2) also creates a similar private right
of action with respect to any material misstatements or omissions in any
prospectus or oral communication used to solicit the sale of a registered
security.'2 Thus, under both causes of action, a plaintiff must prove:
"(1) the prospectus contained an omission; (2) the omission was material;
(3) [the defendants] had a duty to disclose the material information; and
(4) the information existed at the time the prospectus became effective."A3
Whereas a claim under § 11 may be made only against the issuer of
the securities, the issuer's directors, anyone who signed the 1933 Act
registration statement, the underwriters of the offering, and any
accountants or other experts who have been named (and consented to
such disclosure) in the registration statement, a claim under § 12(a)(2)
may be made against any person who sells a security (not just the
person who transfers title to the security), including anyone who
"successfully solicits the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire
to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner."14
Under both § 11 and § 12(a)(2), there is no scienter requirement."

B. Miyahira v. Vitacost.com, Inc.
1. Disclosure in Prospectus. In September 2009, Vitacost filed its
prospectus (after its 1933 Act registration statement was declared
effective) to offer and sell its securities to the public in an IPO. In the
prospectus, Vitacost included biographies for its officers and directors,
including Wayne Gorsek, the founder and Chief Operations Architect,
and Eigerwand Bjornstad, the company's Vice President of Manufacturing. The disclosure in the prospectus stated that, because of a prior
action by the SEC, Gorsek did not exercise policy-making authority and
if Vitacost permitted him to do so the NASDAQ Stock Market (the

11.
12.
13.

Id. at 1265 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)).
Id.
Id. at 1266 (citing Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th

Cir. 2002)).
14. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 647 (1988). In that decision, the United States
Supreme Court refused to extend liability to (1) gratuitous sellers who urge the purchase
of the securities out of a desire to benefit the prospective buyer or (2) participants only
remotely related to the relevant aspects of the sales transaction, such as accountants and
lawyers whose involvement is only the performance of their professional services. Id. at
647, 651-52.
15. A necessary element in virtually any action for fraud, whether under the securities
laws or under state tort laws, is scienter, which is the intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.
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market on which Vitacost was seeking to have its shares quoted in
connection with the IPO) could delist Vitacost's shares. The prospectus
also included risk-factor disclosure regarding the departure of key
personnel but did not disclose that any key personnel (including Gorsek
and Bjornstad) would be leaving Vitacost shortly after the IPO."'
In addition, the prospectus included disclosure regarding Vitacost's
anticipated need, within the next twelve to eighteen months, to secure
additional space for its distribution platform and, within approximately
six months thereafter, the need to secure additional space to expand the
company's manufacturing capabilities. The prospectus, however, also
included risk-factor disclosure regarding "difficulty expanding our
manufacturing and distribution facilities" and "disruptions in our
manufacturing system.""
Finally, the prospectus included extensive disclosure regarding FDA
regulations applicable to the company, as well as specific risk factors
related to FDA regulations. In particular, the prospectus disclosed that
the FDA may determine that certain advertising and promotional claims
are not in compliance with applicable laws and regulations.' 9
2. Pre- and Post-IPO Facts. Though not disclosed in the
prospectus, prior to the IPO, the CEO of Vitacost had informed a
confidential witness that "Gorsek and Bjornstad were 'short timers' who
would soon be gone from Vitacost," and that the CEO "planned to
terminate Bjornstad as soon as Vitacost reported its [third quarter of
2009] numbers;" 20 this was important because, as confirmed by
numerous confidential witnesses, Bjornstad was "largely responsible for
building Vitacost's manufacturing operation into a success."'
In
addition, several months prior to the IPO, Vitacost's management had
decided to relocate its west-coast distribution center and had begun
searching for new space for the relocation.
Shortly after the IPO, in December 2009, the CEO of Vitacost forced
Gorsek out of the company and terminated Bjornstad's employment. In
the same month, Vitacost managers were summoned to the FDA's

16. The key portion of the risk-factor statement read: "Our success depends to a
significant degree upon the continued contributions of our executive officers and other key
personnel." Miyahira, 715 F.3d at 1262 (quoting prospectus).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1263 (quoting prospectus).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1261 (quoting the record). As noted above, the IPO commenced in September
2009, just prior to the end of the third quarter of 2009.
21. Id. (quoting the record).
22. Id. at 1260-61.
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regional office, which resulted in Vitacost being forced to remove and
change certain product labels that made prohibited health claims; these
violations were similar to violations (for other products) that Vitacost
committed in 2005. Finally, in November 2009, the company filed an 8K disclosing that it had entered into a lease for a new distribution
facility in Las Vegas; a lease that had an effective date of September 30,
2009 (a few days after the IPO). 23
3. Analysis of Materiality of Alleged Misstatements in Prospectus. Beginning first with the terminations of Gorsek and Bjornstad
shortly after the IPO, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the plaintiffs'
argument that the prospectus contained a material omission by not
disclosing that the company's CEO intended to fire these executives after
the IPO.24 While plaintiffs demonstrated that numerous personnel
within the company viewed these executives as vital to the success of the
company, the court determined that this focus was "misguided"; what
matters to the analysis was "whether, given the information required to
be provided to investors before the IPO, investors would have viewed
Gorsek and Bjornstad's impending departures as material to their
investment decision. 25
When viewed under this lens, the court determined that the alleged
misstatements regarding Gorsek and Bjornstad were not material.2 6
It was clearly disclosed in the prospectus that Gorsek's policy-making
role was limited because of a prior SEC enforcement action.2 ' As a
result, the court held that "no reasonable investor could have viewed his
departure as significantly altering the total mix of information available."" Furthermore, with respect to Bjornstad, because there was
nothing in the prospectus suggesting that his continued employment was
critical to the success of the company, "investors had no reason to think
that without him the company would not continue to be successful."2 9
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit did not address the question of
whether Vitacost was required to disclose, in its risk factors or elsewhere, that the continued employment of Bjornstad was vital to its
success. In addition, the court did not address the fact that the risk
factor regarding the departure of "executive officers" and other key

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.

1263-64.
1266.
1266-67.
1267.
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personnel would presumably apply to the departure of Bjornstad; the
company had already disclosed the importance of the departure of any
executive officers (including Bjornstad) to its continued success.o
Therefore, Bjornstad's departure could have reasonably been viewed by
an investor as significantly altering the total mix of information.
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed the plaintiffs' arguments that
Vitacost's disclosure regarding its new distribution facility and violations
of FDA regulations were materially misleading.a" The court quickly
dispensed with the FDA regulatory disclosure by pointing out that the
plaintiffs' allegations attempted to link a prior violation of FDA
regulations (from 2005) to a violation of similar regulations for
completely different products. 32 As stated by the court, the plaintiffs'
allegation seemed to be that "by virtue of being notified that four specific
products needed to be re-labeled in 2005, Vitacost had knowledge that
it was not in compliance with regard to other, unrelated products in
2009."3
As to the allegations of material misstatements surrounding the
company's new distribution facility, the court viewed the company's riskfactor disclosure regarding its expectation that it would need to relocate
its distribution facilities within the next twelve to eighteen months as
having successfully staved the plaintiffs' allegations of a material
misstatement.34 All that had been proven, the court held, was that
Vitacost had begun looking for a new space for its distribution facility.35
Without an allegation that either Vitacost knew it "would locate, or had
already located, a new facility and when the relocation would occur,
there [was] nothing false or misleading about the prospectus."3l
4. Lessons from Miyahira. If there is one lesson that can be
gleaned from the Miyahira decision, it is the importance of a welldrafted disclosure document for a public offering of securities. Despite
the fact that the plaintiffs had marshalled evidence that Vitacost's
management knew, before commencement of the IPO, that it was
planning on relocating its distribution facilities and that two of its
executive officers would be terminated, the Eleventh Circuit viewed
these facts as, at most, sufficient to show that there were immaterial

30. Id. at 1262 (quoting prospectus) ("Our success depends to a significant degree upon
the coninued contributions of our executive officers.. ...
31. Id. at 1267.
32. Id. at 1267-68.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1267.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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misstatements in the prospectus." The court focused on the disclosure
required in the document itself and determined that because of the
existing disclosures in the prospectus, the omitted facts were not
material in light of what was required to be disclosed."
II.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES Loss CAUSATION UNDER
SECTION 10(B) OF THE EXCHANGE ACT

While having a prominent hedge fund investor publicly prognosticate
on the low value of your stock and questionable accounting policies and
having to tell the market that you face an SEC investigation is an
unenviable position for any public company, can it be the basis for loss
causation in a securities fraud claim? That is the question the Eleventh
Circuit faced in Meyer v. Greene."
In Meyer, the plaintiffs in a consolidated class action alleged that St.
Joe Company had violated §§ 10(b) and 20(a)4 0 of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5.41 The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Florida dismissed the claim for failing to plead loss causation,
actionable misrepresentation, and scienter. The plaintiffs appealed the
district court's ruling.4 2
The allegations originated from St. Joe's financial statements and the
manner in which St. Joe valued its assets. From its early beginnings in
the 1930s, St. Joe had amassed a considerable real estate holding in
Florida. St. Joe used this land primarily for residential, commercial, and
industrial development, as well as raw land sales and timber cultivation.
This real estate appreciated in value considerably during the early
2000s," and the carrying value of this land as shown on the company's
balance sheet reflected this appreciation-as of December 31, 2007, a
total investment value of $943,540,000." However, while St. Joe and
its real estate portfolio was not immune to the real estate downturn in
2008, St. Joe nonetheless continued to show the carrying value of its real
estate at pre-recession highs.45

37. See id.
38. Id. Underlying the court's discussion appears to be an assumption that the
disclosure document was fully compliant with the disclosure requirements under the
Securities Act.
39. 710 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2013).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (2012).
41. Meyer, 710 F.3d at 1192.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. ST. JOE COMPANY, ANNUAL REPoRT (FoRM 10-K) 24 (FEB. 21, 2008) available at
http/A/www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/745308/000095013508001146/b68110sjelOvk.htm>.
45. Meyer, 710 F.3d at 1192.
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On October 13, 2010, prominent hedge fund investor David Einhorn
publicly challenged St. Joe's carrying value for its real estate assets,
asserting that this value was artificially inflated and thus should be
"impaired"-that is, the value should be written down to a much lower
amount. Within two days following Einhorn's statement, the market
value of St. Joe's stock decreased by twenty percent. On November 3,
2010, the plaintiffs filed their complaint alleging St. Joe violated
securities laws by failing to reduce the carrying value of its real estate.
The district court dismissed the case and the plaintiffs appealed to the
Eleventh Circuit."
The Eleventh Circuit applied the precedent that, for any private cause
of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the plaintiff must plead
(1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter-a wrongful
state of mind; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation and the
purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance, "often referred to in [fraudon-the-market cases] as transaction causation;" (5) economic loss; and
(6) "loss causation, i.e., a causal connection between the material
misrepresentation and the loss." 7
The court first analyzed the reliance element of the § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claim, discussing the traditional showing of reliance (which
requires that the plaintiff was aware of the misstatement and purchased
stock based upon that misrepresentation) in comparison to the fraud-onthe-market theory (which assumes that the price of publicly traded
shares reflects all publicly available information, including misstatements, and thus provides a rebuttable presumption that purchasers rely
on all public statements-and misstatements-when purchasing
securities at the market price).48 The court seemingly accepted the
plaintiffs' use of the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish their prima
facie case. 49 However, in a twist of fate, the court's acceptance of this
principle was the death knell to the plaintiffs' securities-fraud claim, for
it effectively precluded the plaintiffs from successfully proving another
necessary element of a claim of securities fraud-loss causation.50
In a § 10(b) claim, the plaintiff must prove loss causation, that is,
"proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the
investment's subsequent decline in value,"" in essence showing "not
only that a fraudulent misrepresentation artificially inflated the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1194 (quoting Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005).
Id. at 1194-95.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id. (quoting Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997)).
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security's value, but also that 'the fraud-induced inflation that was
baked into the plaintiff's purchase price was subsequently removed from
the stock's price, thereby causing losses to the plaintiff."'52 The court
provided a simple illustration of loss causation in the context of an
electronics manufacturer that produces both laptop computers and
televisions." A material misrepresentation in the laptop segment that
caused a 50% increase in the company's stock price (from $20 to $30 per
share) would not give rise to a § 10(b) claim if the company reports that
its television business is poorly performing and thus the stock price
declined by 50% (from $30 to $15 per share)." In essence, the misrepresentation in the laptop segment did not cause the plaintiff's loss;
rather, traditional business forces did, and the artificial inflation
resulting from the laptop misrepresentation still is reflected in the $15
stock price. 5 Yet, if the laptop misrepresentation subsequently is
discovered and disclosed through a corrective disclosure, declines in
stock price attributable to that corrective disclosure will be actionable.56
The court was quick to point out that the loss-causation element does
not require proof that the material misstatement is the sole cause of the
loss, but that it must be a "substantial or significant cause" of the stockprice decline.5
The court set out the elements necessary to show loss causation in a
fraud-on-the-market reliance case:
(1) identifying a "corrective disclosure" (a release of information that
reveals to the market the pertinent truth that was previously concealed

or obscured by the company's fraud); (2) showing that the stock price
dropped soon after the corrective disclosure; and (3) eliminating other

possible explanations for this price drop, so that the factfnder can infer
that it is more probable than not that it was the corrective disclosure-as opposed to other possible depressive factors-that caused at

least a "substantial" amount of the price drop."

52. Id. (quoting Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 688 F.3d 713, 725 (11th Cir.
2012)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1195-96.
55. Id. at 1196.
56. Id.
57. Id. (quoting Hubbard,688 F.3d at 725) (internal quotation marks omitted).
58. Id. at 1196-97 (quoting FindWhat Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282,
1311-12 (11th Cir. 2011).
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The court stated that the first element-'a corrective disclosure' - "must
... relate back to the misrepresentation,"" and that a corrective
disclosure can take the form of "a series of partial disclosures."o
The court then applied the plaintiffs' asserted corrective disclosures,
specifically the Einhorn presentation, the SEC investigation announcement, and the heightened SEC investigation announcement, to these
elements.e" The court was unmoved by the plaintiffs' argument that
the Einhorn presentation constituted a corrective disclosure.62 The
court pointed out that the bedrock of the fraud-on-the-market theory is
the efficient market hypothesis-that a market that is operating
efficiently has incorporated all publicly available information into the
stock price.6 3 "A corollary of the efficient market hypothesis is that
disclosure of... information already known. . . will not cause a change
in the stock price" and that "[clorrective disclosures must present
facts to the market that are new, that is, publicly revealed for the first
time."" The court pointed to the fact that Einhorn's presentation, by
its own disclaimer, was gathered from public filings and other publicly
available information-thus, there was no new information being
provided that could constitute a corrective disclosure.66 The court held
that the plaintiffs' assertion that the fraud-on-the-market theory was
appropriate for reliance, yet publicly available information could suffice
for causation, was contradictory and chose not to attempt to reconcile the
two.
Instead, the court pointed out the "Delphic sword" perils of
pleading the fraud-on-the-market theory; the court explained that
because an efficient market has taken into account all publicly available
information, and that information is reflected in the stock price, a
plaintiff cannot set aside this premise and assert the re-disclosure of
already public information caused the stock price to decline." The
court went further by stating the following:

59. Id. at 1197 (quoting In re Williams Secs. Litig.-WCG Subclass, 558 F.3d 1130, 1140
(10th Cir. 2009)).
60. Id. (quoting Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 261 (5th Cir. 2009).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting FindWhatInvestor Grp., 658 F.3d at 1310).
65. Id. at 1197-98 (alteration in the original) (quoting Katyle v. Penn Nat'l Gaming,
Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 473 (4th Cir. 2011)).
66. Id. at 1198.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1198-99.
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[plut another way, because the information used in the presentation
had already been public for some time, the decline in the value of St.
Joe's shares in the wake of the Einhorn Presentation was not due to
the fact that the presentation was revelatory of any fraud, but was
instead due to "changed investor expectations" after an investor who
wielded great clout in the industry voiced a negative opinion about the
Company.69
If every analyst or short-seller's opinion based on already-public
information could form the basis for a corrective disclosure, then every
investor who suffers a loss in the financial markets could sue under
§ 10(b) using an analyst's negative analysis of public filings as a
corrective disclosure. That cannot be-nor is it-the law."o
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs' assertion that announcement
of the SEC investigation and later heightened investigation constituted
corrective disclosures and thus loss causation." The plaintiffs argued
that the investigations covered the same subject matter, namely the
value of St. Joe's real estate holdings and that there was a drop in St.
Joe's stock price shortly after announcing the investigations.72 However, the court pointed to the requirement that "a corrective disclosure
must 'reveal[] to the market the falsity of [a] prior misstatementl].'"
The court did not find any such revelation, but, to the contrary, pointed
to a statement in the company's initial disclosure of the SEC investigation stating that the "notification from the SEC does not indicate any
allegations of wrongdoing, and an inquiry is not an indication of any
violations of federal securities laws."" The court pointed to a number
of district court cases holding that disclosure of an investigation is not
a corrective disclosure, but as a case of first impression at the circuit
court level, the court created precedent in ruling "the commencement of
an SEC investigation, without more, is insufficient to constitute a
corrective disclosure for purposes of § 10(b)."" In supporting this
conclusion, the court stated,
To be sure, stock prices may fall upon the announcement of an SEC
investigation, but that is because the investigation can be seen to

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
n.28).
74.
75.

Id. at 1200 (quoting Duna Pharms., Inc., 544 U.S. at 343).
Id. at 1199.
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id. (alterations in the original) (quoting FindWhat Investor Grp., 658 F.3d at 1311
Id. at 1201 (quoting the trial court record).
Id.
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portend an added risk of future corrective action. That does not mean
that the investigations, in and of themselves, reveal to the market that
a company's previous statements were false or fraudulent.76
In affirming the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of
loss causation, the court summarized its holding by stating as follows:
In the financial markets, not every bit of bad news that has a negative
effect on the price of a security necessarily has a corrective effect for
purposes of loss causation. And though we appreciate the importance
of private securities fraud actions in deterring fraud and promoting
confidence in the marketplace, we are equally mindful that their
purpose is "not to provide investors with broad insurance against
market losses, but to protect them against those economic losses that
misrepresentations actually cause." Our decision today ensures that
loss causation remains a key sentinel in striking that delicate
balance."
III.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES MATERIALITY IN
SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

In 2012, the Eleventh Circuit addressed two SEC enforcement cases
that focused on the materiality standard in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
securities fraud. Interestingly, the court ruled for the SEC in a case
where a large investment bank allegedly was involved in fraud
stemming from a wide market issue, namely, auction rate securities
transactions, and ruled against the SEC in a case where fraud was not
only alleged, but admitted, by an individual of a smaller brokerage firm.
In SEC v. Morgan Keegan & Co.," the court considered the effect an
oral misrepresentation by an individual broker to a small class of
investors has on the materiality element of a § 10(b) claim where there
existed detailed written disclosures correcting this misstatement. 9 The
claims arose from the meltdown and resulting illiquidity of the Auction
Rate Securities (ARS) market in the United States during late 2007 and
the spring of 2008. During this period, Morgan Keegan prepared and
made available numerous written documents describing the ARS auction
process and liquidity risks. Yet, it was alleged that on certain occasions
during the period of growing illiquidity and uncertainty in the ARS
market, Morgan Keegan brokers continued to tout orally ARS invest-
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ments in a manner contrary to the written disclosures. 0 The SEC
brought suit against Morgan Keegan alleging violation of §§ 10(b) and
15(c)(1)s' and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, and § 17(a)82 of the
Securities Act.
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia held that the required materiality element was not
satisfied because the misrepresentations to a few investors did not
"significantly alter [] the 'total mix' of information available" to a
reasonable investor."
The Eleventh Circuit first considered the elements of a § 10(b) claim,
specifically, "(1) a material misrepresentation or materially misleading
omission, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (3)
made with scienter.",1 The court noted that, unlike private causes of
action, the SEC does not have to prove reliance and causation." Based
upon Morgan Keegan's grounds for dismissal at the district court-solely
lack of materiality-the court determined that all other elements of the
§ 10(b) claim existed. 7 The court then applied the long-standing
Supreme Court materiality test, namely that
[an omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
[take a particular action relative to the security] ... [iun other words,
. . . if there is a "substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the

omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available."'
The court then applied this test to the facts of that case. Morgan
Keegan asserted that the misstatements were not material because they
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were made only to a few investors and not to the public as a whole."
In dismissing this argument, the court stated that the materiality
element requires a review of the misstatement from a reasonable
investor's (singular) perspective, not that of the public.90 "[Tihe
materiality test requires the court to consider all the information
available to the hypothetical reasonable investor, which necessarily
includes private communications ... [aind the fact-finder could easily
conclude that a reasonable investor would find liquidity risk an
important factor in determining whether to invest in ARS. .. ." The
court further stated that the SEC is only required to prove materiality
and scienter in a misrepresentation and the insignificance of the effect
on the public is irrelevant to an enforcement action: 'The extent of the
brokers' misrepresentations may ultimately affect the size of the remedy,
such as fines or disgorgement," but not materiality.92
The court then considered the effect of Morgan Keegan's written
disclosures on the oral misstatements. Morgan Keegan asserted that the
written disclosures contradicted and corrected the brokers' oral
statements and thus rendered the oral misstatements immaterial."
The court stated that the manner in which information is disseminated
(orally or written) is relevant to materiality; however, there is no rule
that precludes an investor "from recovering under Rule 10b-5 if the
misrepresentations upon which the investor relied were oral and conflict
in some way with contemporaneous written representations available to
the investor."94 Analogizing from private action cases that have ruled
on this issue in the context of analyzing reliance, the court stated that
whether written disclosures render oral misstatements immaterial is an
intense facts-and-circumstances review." The court then considered
how the written disclosure materials were disseminated to customers.
The court noted that Morgan Keegan lacked evidence that it delivered
the written disclosures, citing testimony from clients stating they had
not received written disclosures prior to purchasing ARS, no evidence
that brokers directed customers to the Morgan Keegan website
containing ARS disclosures, and an improper reliance on a written trade
confirmation that was delivered to customers only after the ARS trade

89. Id. at 1247.
90. Id. at 1248.
91. Id. at 1248, 1249.
92. Id. at 1249.
93. Id. at 1250.
94. Id. (quoting Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989)).
95. Id. at 1250-51 (comparing Bruschi, 876 F.2d 1526, with First Union Discount
Brokerage Servs., Inc. v. Milos, 997 F.2d 835 (11th Cir. 1993)).

1102

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

had occurred." The court held that the written disclosures, while
adequate in substance, were "distributed only in [a] weak or noneffective manner" and thus did not render the direct oral misstatements
to be immaterial."
Finally, Morgan Keegan asserted that the availability of the written
disclosures to any "reasonably diligent investor" caused the oral
misrepresentations to be immaterial." The court summarily dismissed
this argument, noting that an investor-diligence requirement is a
reliance concept, and reliance is not an element of Rule 10b-5 SECenforcement claims."
The Eleventh Circuit once again addressed the issue of materiality in
an SEC enforcement action in SEC v. Goble.'o In Goble, the defendant was the founder of a securities-and-clearing brokerage firm. The
enforcement action stemmed from the defendant's admitted fraud in
overstating the brokerage firm's reserve account maintained in
accordance with the Consumer Protection Rule.'' In summary, the
Consumer Protection Rule requires an amount equal to a certain
percentage of client funds held by a brokerage firm to be deposited in a
special account. If the account balance falls below this certain percentage, the brokerage firm is required to deposit more money. Likewise, if
the account has excess money relative to the percentage threshold, the
brokerage firm may remove the excess. 0 2 Faced with financial
difficulties, the defendant overstated the reserve account balance by
entering a false money market purchase on the account's ledgers, thus
falsely reflecting a considerably higher value.'o That inflated value
permitted the defendant to withdraw a significant amount of money
from the account, rendering the account severely underfunded.0 "
The SEC brought a § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim against the
defendant. 0 ' The United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida found that the defendant had violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b5.106 In reviewing the case, the Eleventh Circuit applied the test for
§ 10(b) liability: "(1) material misrepresentations or materially mislead-
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ing omissions, (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities,
(3) made with scienter."lo' The defendant asserted that his misstatement was not material because it was only in an internal record and not
made to customers or the public as required by § 10(b). The SEC argued
that the internal record misstatement was material because it hid the
insecurity of the brokerage firm, and this insecurity would be material
to customers in choosing a broker-dealer to process their transactions.'o The court again looked to the test for materiality: "whether
a reasonable man would attach importance to the fact misrepresented
or omitted in determining his course of action."1o' The court determined that "course of action" "mean[s] an investment decision-not an
individual's choice of broker-dealers.""o The court held that misstatements that only affect broker-dealer selection cannot be the basis for a
§ 10(b) claim because it is not tied to an investment decision."'
Despite disposing of the § 10(b) claim based upon immateriality, the
court also considered the defendant's additional assertion that the
misstatement was not in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. The SEC contended that the sham money-market purchase
constituted a securities transaction." 2 The court looked to the intentions behind the "in connection with" requirement to determine if the
sham transaction fell within the element.13 The court held that
§ 10(b) does not require an actual purchase or sale of securities."
However, the court distinguished Goble from prior cases by pointing to
the fact that Goble did not take money for a securities transaction, no
securities ownership changed hands, and there was no promise to
purchase a security."
To the contrary, the court held that the
inaccurate book entry was just that, a book entry, and not a securities
transaction actionable under § 10(b)."6
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